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Explosive growth in derivatives activity has been fueled by
financial market innovations and the need to actively manage the
interest rate and exchange rate risks inherent in the operations
of large financial intermediaries. Derivatives are now an
essential element of financial activity, enabling intermediaries
to hedge market risks more efficiently. However, they also can
entail risks to both the bank and the banking system. These
risks are magnified if troubled banks, with a strong incentive to
speculate, take derivatives positions that could result in losses
sufficient to imperil not only the institution, but also
financial markets more generally.
A number of banks actively
have had financial difficulties
difficulties resulted primarily
engaged in derivatives markets
in recent years. Those
from problem real estate loans
rather than derivatives activity. However, whatever the original
source of the problem, derivatives offer an opportunity to place
large second bets, once a
The recent losses at
the fact that derivatives
bank has financial difficulties.
Barings, Daiwa, and Sumitomo highlight
positions are difficult to monitor and
that even a few individual traders can generate
losses . Thus , although it does not appear that




should be a concern. This is particularly the case given that
banks active in derivatives markets have been more likely to be





have received a formal
reflects a perception by examiners
failure.
a significant percentage of
activity in the first half of
regulatory action, which
of a significant risk of
The fact that many financially troubled institutions engage
in potentially speculative activities should be of particular
concern following the recent savings and loan debacle, in which
institutions having low capital and backed by deposit insurance
similarly had the motive, the means, and the opportunity to take
large risks. The widespread losses in the savings and loan
industry led to supervisory and legislative changes intended to
reduce moral hazard problems in the future. While these changes
have led to more frequent and more comprehensive oversight of
banking institutions, their primary focus
risks. This increased attention may have
is on-balance-sheet
been a factor in the
subsequent movement of an increasing amount of bank activity off
their balance sheets.
We find no evidence that derivatives activity has been a
factor in formal regulatory intervention or even in downgrades
supervisory ratings of banks. Typically, derivatives activity
hardly, if at all, mentioned explicitly in formal regulatory
actions, while lending activity, loan monitoring, and reserves
of
is
for problem loans are usually discussed exhaustively. This may
reflect the fact that most banking problems in the early 1990s
pre-dated some of the more highly publicized problems with
2derivatives, and they do not appear to have resulted in the
troubled banks using derivatives to place second bets. But, if
the purpose of the regulatory action is to reduce the probability
that a problem bank will fail, and to limit the cost to the
deposit insurance fund if the bank does eventually fail, the
omission of any discussion of off-balance-sheet activity in
formal actions may be a serious shortcoming.
Insufficient regulatory attention to derivatives activity at
problem banks may fail to prevent speculative excesses
recognized only as a consequence of a bet lost, rather




Report data are not sufficiently detailed to reveal








to derivatives in earlier formal regulatory actions
supervisors should focus greater attention on off-
balance-sheet activity of troubled institutions. Troubled banks
not only have the motive to place second bets and the means to do
so, derivatives, but appear also to have the opportunity.
The first section of this paper discusses the use of off-
site and on-site examinations to monitor bank risk, particularly




engaged in derivatives activity. The
whether derivatives activity affects
supervisory intervention. The final
section considers possible policy issues.
3I. Overview of Derivatives Activity and Supervisory Oversight
Banks have been aggressively expanding their use of
derivatives. Derivatives allow banks to actively manage the
interest rate risk and exchange rate risk inherent in the normal
course of their business. Holding loans denominated in foreign
currencies and making loans funded with deposits of a shorter
maturity make banks susceptible to fluctuations in exchange rates
or interest rates, and derivatives can provide a cost-effective
means to manage such interest rate and exchange
However, other less benign explanations for the




Boyd and Gertler (1993) have argued that increased
competition has caused large banks to adopt riskier portfolios.
One way to increase risk (and hopefully return) is through off-
balance-sheet activities such as derivatives (Koppenhaver
Stover 1991; Avery and Berger 1991) . However, a careful
and
examination of derivatives use as a tool to increase or decrease
risk is severely handicapped by the very limited availability of
information on bank derivatives activity.
The primary source of information on the derivatives
activity of banks is the quarterly Call Report. Unfortunately,
Call Report information is inadequate for evaluating the
riskiness of derivatives positions (Simons 1995, Gorton and Rosen
1995) . The notional values of swaps, futures and forward
contracts, and written and purchased options
interest rate contracts and foreign exchange
4
are reported for
rate contracts.However, the Call Reports do not report long and short positions
of forward and futures contracts separately. Nor do they provide
separate information on call and put options written or bought.
In addition, the reported categories are very broad. For
example, interest rate caps, interest rate floors, and interest
rate collars are all included as options contracts, even though
the exposure of the bank to interest rate fluctuations is likely
to differ for the various instruments. And even if such
information were available, it would have to be tied back to on-
balance-sheet positions in order to evaluate the effect of these
derivatives activities on overall bank risk.
This severely limits the ability of bank supervisors or bank
analysts to monitor derivatives positions and determine their
effect on bank performance. Supervisors normally conduct off-
site monitoring to determine whether a bank’s financial condition
has deteriorated since its last exam. If it has, a full exam can
be scheduled earlier or a targeted exam can be scheduled to
address particular concerns. For standard on-balance-sheet
items, off-site surveillance involves the calculation of standard
ratios to determine whether the institution is deviating from its
historical performance or from the performance of peer
institutions. Directing scarce examiner resources to problem
areas and problem institutions can only be done if adequate data
are available to warn supervisors of impending problems. In the
case of derivatives, the off-site information is inadequate to
determine the contribution of changes in derivatives positions to
5a bank’s overall risk.
Given the dearth of useful data on risks posed by
derivatives, any assessment by supervisors of the risks from
derivatives activity must
than off-site monitoring.
discuss, and if necessary
be based on on-site examinations rather
Examiners then can evaluate and
limit, derivatives activity as part of
the exam, through informal agreements on derivatives activity in
the form of board resolutions or a memorandum of understanding,
or, in the case of severe violations, through formal regulatory
actions.
Formal regulatory actions, written agreements or cease and
desist orders, are the most severe regulatory action available
short of closing the bank.
1 They are legally enforceable and
publicly disclosed and, in the event of noncompliance, can result
in civil penalties. These actions can be issued for any major
shortcoming that can imperil the safety and soundness of an
institution. While some are directed at specific practices of
the bank, most commonly they are issued because of concerns about
the safety and soundness of the bank. The actions will generally
require changes in management information systems, reserving
procedures, and capital adequacy. Formal actions are generally
quite specific on actions to be taken in monitoring loans, but
they usually contain no specific discussion of derivatives
activity.
Among large U.S. banks with at least some derivatives
activities (532 banks) , over 16 percent came under a formal
6action during the first half of the decade. A slightly higher
percentage of large banks with a notional value of derivatives
exceeding 10 percent of their assets came under a formal action.
Still, no significant incident of these banks taking second bets
with derivatives appears to have occurred. Nonetheless, a bank
in a precarious position that is active in derivatives has a
strong incentive, given deposit insurance, to take risks that may
not be easily monitored in the absence of direct oversight.
Since formal actions are generally issued to banks with the
lowest supervisory ratings and with the highest probability of
failure, these institutions should have substantial supervisory
attention given to their derivatives activity, given its
potential for large and rapid changes in the overall risk
exposure of a bank.
The one specific requirement found in nearly all formal
actions is an increase in capital ratios. While formal actions
often require banks to be in compliance with risk-based capital
requirements, which could cause a bank to restrict its
derivatives activity, most frequently they require the bank to
meet a 6 percent leverage ratio (Peek and Rosengren 1995a) , which
gives no weight to off-balance-sheet activities and, thus, puts
no particular pressure on the bank to restrict them.
The inability to monitor derivatives risks off-site and the
lack of discussion in formal actions of controlling derivatives
risks raise the issue of whether current oversight of the
derivatives activities at troubled institutions is sufficient.
7Formal actions can exceed 50 pages in length, detailing actions
needed to reduce risks and improve management’s ability to
monitor and manage risks, yet they generally contain relatively
little, if anything, concerning derivatives activity. While most
of the problems at banks with formal actions stemmed from on-
balance-sheet activities, derivatives still have great potential
as instruments to be used to place second bets. The next section
will investigate the extent to which active bank participants in
derivatives markets have had financial difficulties, based on
their capital ratios or on supervisory assessments, in order to
examine whether additional attention to derivatives activity is
warranted.
II. Derivatives Activity at Troubled Institutions
Table 1 lists the 25 most active banks in the United States,
based on the notional value of their exchange rate derivatives
activity in the first quarter of 1990. For each bank, the table
indicates the size of its exchange rate derivatives positions,
both in absolute terms and relative to assets. Seven of these 25
banks were subject to a formal action for at least part of the
five-year period from the beginning of 1990 through the end of
1994. Five of the seven have publicly disclosed their formal
actions: Bankers Trust, First National Bank of Boston, Bank of
New England NA (two formal actions) , Connecticut National Bank,
and Shawmut Bank NA. Only Bankers Trust had  a formal action that
targeted its derivatives activity. Some of these formal actions
8made no mention of derivatives activity. Others discussed
liquidity risk or market risk concerns associated with the bank’s
derivatives activity. However, when these concerns were
mentioned, they typically accounted for only a few sentences in
the entire document. In these formal actions (other than the one
for Bankers Trust), to the extent they discuss derivatives
activities at all, the focus is more on the liquidity risks faced
by banks as a consequence of customer concerns about the
viability of the bank, rather than on the risks the bank might
undertake in an effort to reverse its financial impairment.
While this, in part, reflects greater attention to areas where
banks had experienced documented losses, such as real estate,
derivatives activity should still be a concern to the extent it
provides an opportunity to take second bets.
Table 2 provides similar information for the 25 banks with
the largest notional values of interest rate derivatives in
1990:I. Again, 15 of the 25 banks have a volume of notional
interest rate derivatives activity in excess of the volume of
their assets, with one as high as 1,776 percent of assets. Five
of the 25 institutions most active in interest rate derivatives
had a formal action during the 1990:I - 1994:IV period. Each of
the five was also among the 25 banks most active in exchange rate
derivatives activity, listed in the previous table.
The large proportion of banks with sizable derivatives
positions that received formal regulatory actions raises the
question of whether banks engaged in derivatives activities are
9overrepresented among troubled banks. Table 3 presents
characteristics related to a bank’s financial health for large
U.S. banks (assets greater than $300 million in 1988:IV), grouped
according to the bank’s average ratio of the notional value of
total derivatives to total assets during the 1990:I - 1994:IV
period.
Risk-based capital ratios provide one assessment of the
extent to which banks are financially troubled. Banks with a
risk-based capital ratio below 8 percent are classified as
“undercapitalized” in the guidelines that were established as a




(FDICIA). Almost 21 percent of the banks without any
activity fell below the 8 percent threshold at some
the 1990:I - 1994:IV period. However, much higher
shares of banks with some derivatives activities fell below the 8
percent threshold, with the share tending to rise with greater
derivatives exposure relative to assets. Over 25 percent of
banks with a ratio of notional derivatives to assets between O
and 5 percent fell below the 8 percent threshold; the share rises
to over 54 percent for those banks whose notional value of
derivatives exceeded 100 percent of their assets. This evidence
indicates that banks with relatively more derivatives activity
were overrepresented among undercapitalized banks. In part, this
reflects size differences. Large,  more diversified banks are
generally less well capitalized than small banks. However, the
greater diversification of assets at large banks should have




of 9 and 10 percent.
probability of becoming undercapitalized,
not to have been the case during this
appear using risk-based capital thresholds
Under the FDICIA risk-based capital
guidelines, banks with risk-based capital ratios between 8 and 10
percent are deemed to be only “adequately capitalized” and a
ratio in excess of 10 percent is required for a bank to qualify
as “well capitalized. ” Compared to large banks with no
derivatives activity, banks whose notional values of derivatives
activities exceeded 5 percent of their assets include roughly
twice the share of
both the 9 and the
The  volume of
banks with risk-based capital ratios below
10 percent thresholds.
problem loans relative to total loans in a
bank’s portfolio provides another
health. The share of banks whose
measure of a bank’s financial
ratio of nonperforming loans
(the sum of loans past due more than 90 days and nonaccruing
loans) to total loans exceeded 5 percent at some time during
1990 to 1994 window is another objective measure of credit
the
problems. Nearly 38 percent of large banks with no derivatives
activity had a nonperforming loans ratio exceeding 5 percent at
some time during the window. While that share was not
consistently below those for all the categories of banks with
some derivatives activities, it was well below the share for the
group of banks with the highest derivatives exposure.
Examiners’ assessments of troubled banks appears to be less
11closely related to the volume of a bank’s derivatives activities.
Nearly 24 percent of the banks with no derivatives activities
fell into the two lowest examiner ratings categories for banks,
CAMEL 4 indicating a possibility of failure and CAMEL 5
indicating that a bank is likely to fail.
2 This is roughly the
same as the share of banks whose derivatives activity equaled
less than 5 percent of assets. Yet only 21 percent of banks
whose notional values of derivatives exceeded 100 percent of
their assets and 22 percent of banks with values between 10 and
100 percent fell into these two lowest CAMEL ratings. Only the
set of banks with derivatives activity equaling between 5 and 10
percent of assets had a higher share of banks rated CAMEL 4 or 5
than the banks with no derivatives activity.
Similarly, formal actions taken by examiners against
troubled banks do not appear to have been related to the  volume
(relative to assets) of a bank’s derivatives activities. The
average share receiving formal actions is almost the same for
banks with derivatives activities as for banks with no
derivatives activity. However, because these troubled banks have
the motive, the means, and the opportunity to use derivatives to
take second bets, they should receive more intensive examiner
oversight as they become troubled. The next section investigates
whether examiners take derivatives activity into account when
setting CAMEL ratings and imposing formal actions, controlling
for other problems at the bank.
12III. Factors Affecting Formal Actions and CAMEL Ratings
A bank’s financial health and the nature and degree of risks
in both its on-balance-sheet and its off-balance-sheet
obligations should be important factors in supervisory decisions
to change a bank’s rating or to impose a formal regulatory
action. While much detailed information is available about on-
balance-sheet activities, the same cannot be said of off-balance-
sheet activities. In particular, the information reported in
quarterly Call Reports is not sufficiently detailed to determine
the extent to which banks are speculating or hedging with their
derivatives activities. Because a bank can easily and quickly
expose itself to a substantial amount of risk by taking
speculative positions, derivatives activities should be an
important consideration in supervisory oversight of banks.
The data used here are a pooled time series, cross-section
panel of balance sheet and income statement data from the Call
Reports, supplemented with information on CAMEL ratings and
formal actions. Because formal actions are issued only as a
result of an exam, and because most CAMEL rating changes occur as
a result of an exam, we include only exam quarters in our
regression samples.
3 The sample includes observations for the
1990:I to 1994:IV period on all large (more than $300 million in
assets as of 1988:IV) FDIC-insured domestic banks in the United
States whose principal line of business was not credit cards. We
focus on large banks because smaller banks rarely are active in
derivatives .We consider three alternative dependent variables, each
associated with its own specific sample. The first dependent
variable has a value of one if regulators downgraded the CAMEL
rating of bank i to, or below, a rating of 4 in quarter t, and
zero otherwise. The panel data set includes each observation of
banks that have not yet been downgraded to the CAMEL 4 rating, as
well as each observation of banks up to and including the quarter
of the CAMEL 4 downgrade. Because we are estimating the
probability of a CAMEL downgrade, once a bank has been downgraded
to the new CAMEL rating, its subsequent observations are dropped
from the sample.
4 Similarly, all observations of a bank that was
downgraded prior to 1990:I are omitted.
The panel data sets are constructed in the same manner for
the other two dependent variables related to downgrades to a
CAMEL 5 rating and to the imposition of a formal action. In the
first case, all of a bank’s observations subsequent to the CAMEL
5 downgrade are omitted from the sample. In the second case, all
of a bank’s observations subsequent to the imposition of a formal
action are omitted from the sample. The three data samples used
in the regressions each contain approximately 800 banks with an
average of approximately 2900 observations.
To determine whether involvement in derivatives activity
contributes to triggering a CAMEL downgrade or the imposition of
a formal action, we will estimate the following logistic model:
14where the three alternative dependent variables take on the value
of zero except in the quarter that a bank receives a CAMEL rating
downgrade to 4 or 5, or receives a formal action, respectively,
in which case its value is one. In order to test whether
examiners consider the extent of derivatives activity among the
determinants of CAMEL downgrades and the imposition of formal
actions, we include a vector (Xl) of measures of a bank’s
derivatives activities. We use end-of-quarter data that reflect
the results of the examination, that is, the post-exam data that
would be relevant for supervisors making the decision to
downgrade a bank’s CAMEL rating or to impose a formal action. We
also include as explanatory variables a vector of bank-specific
factors (X2) that have been used in earlier studies to identify
problem and failing banks. (See, for example, Gilbert and Park
1994, Sinkey 1975, Sinkey 1978, Thomson 1991, and Whalen and
Thomson 1988.)
The vector Xl contains two types of measures, (0,1) dummy
variables to indicate whether the bank is a participant in the
derivatives market (if so, the value equals 1) and a measure of
the volume of a bank’s derivatives activity, the ratio of the
notional value of its derivatives to its assets. We consider two
alternative specifications. First, we include, as separate
arguments in the specification, measures of the two main
components of derivatives activity, total exchange rate
derivatives (swaps; spot, forward, and futures commitments; and
options contracts, both written and purchased) and total interest
15rate derivatives (swaps; futures and forward contracts; and
options contracts, both written and purchased) . Second, we
combine the exchange rate and interest rate components into two
measures of total derivatives activity: a measure of the bank’s
total derivatives activity and a dummy variable with a value of
one if the bank engages in either exchange rate or interest rate
derivatives activity.
Because engaging in derivatives activity provides an
additional means for a bank to speculate, should it choose to do
so, involvement in the derivatives market increases the potential
for risk-taking. Thus , we would expect the dummy variables to
have positive coefficients. Then, given that a bank is active in
derivatives, we hypothesize that the greater the derivatives
activity, the greater the potential for the bank to take on risk.
And, because of the increased difficulty of monitoring larger and
more complicated derivatives positions, the greater is the
opportunity (the easier it becomes) for the bank to increase its
risk exposure without being detected. Thus , one might expect
positive coefficients on the measures of the magnitude of
derivatives activity since, after controlling for other problems
at troubled banks, examiners might be more likely to downgrade a
bank’s rating or to impose a formal action at a bank the more
active is the bank in the derivatives market.
The vector of bank-specific factors (X2) contains seven sets
of variables that measure a bank’s capital position, the quality




bank size. The first set of variables captures a
position (the C in CAMEL) . The risk-based capital
the capital position of the bank scaled by its
risk-adjusted assets. Another variable measures the loan loss
reserve, scaled by assets, capturing how well the bank has
already reserved for potential losses. The second set of
variables measures the quality of the asset portfolio (the A in
CAMEL) . It includes nonperforming loans (loans that are 90 days
or more past due or are nonaccruing) scaled by assets, which
provides a measure of problems in the loan portfolio, and other
real estate owned (OREO) , scaled by assets, another measure of
problems in a bank’s asset portfolio.
On-balance-sheet exposures to categories of relatively more
risky assets provide an indication of a bank’s credit-risk
exposure. Thus , the third set of variables includes bank
portfolio concentrations in commercial and industrial loans (C&I
loans), commercial real estate loans (Commercial RE loans), and
construction loans, each scaled by assets.
The fourth set of variables captures the interest rate risk
exposure of the bank. Following Simons (1995) and Kim and
Koppenhaver (1993), we measure GAP variables as the absolute
value of the difference
liabilities maturing or
intervals used are: up
between the volumes of assets and
repricing within a given interval. The
to three months (GAP1),
one year (GAP2) , one year to five years (GAP3) ,




17sheet repricing frequencies or maturities of assets and
liabilities, they do not include any effect on the overall
interest rate risk exposure of the bank resulting from either
speculative or hedging positions the bank undertakes through its
derivatives activity.
Earnings (the E in CAMEL) provide a measure of the ability
of a bank to weather one–time losses. We use the return on
assets as our measure of earnings. A bank’s liquidity (the L in
CAMEL) is of particular importance when-a bank becomes troubled.
Deposit withdrawals and the reluctance of other institutions to . .
subject themselves to counterpart risk through transactions with
a troubled bank can lead to increased liquidity requirements. We
include two measures of liquidity, each scaled by assets,
brokered deposits and liquid assets. Liquid assets include the
market value of securities less the book value of pledged
securities, interest-bearing balances due from depository
institutions, average federal funds sold and securities purchased
under agreements to resell, and assets held in trading accounts.
Finally, we also include the log of total assets (Log(Assets)) to
control for a bank’s size.
Table 4 shows the results of estimating equation (1) for
each of the dependent variables, a downgrade of the composite
CAMEL rating to 4, a downgrade of the composite CAMEL rating to
5, and the imposition of a formal action. For each of these
specifications, we estimate one equation that
rate and exchange rate derivatives separately
18
breaks out interest
and one equationthat combines these variables into measures of total derivatives
activity.
In the six equations presented in the table, not even one of
the estimated coefficients on the dummy variables that indicate
derivatives activity or on the measures of the volume of a bank’s
derivatives activity is statistically significant. In fact, one-
half of the estimated coefficients are negative, indicating a
reduced probability of examiner actions associated with
derivatives activity. These results would suggest that examiners
do not use the fact that a bank engages in derivatives activity
or the notional value of its derivatives activity relative to its
assets in determining whether a troubled bank’s CAMEL rating
should be downgraded to a rating of 4 or 5 or a formal action
should be issued. On the other hand, these results may, instead,
simply reflect the absence of good proxies for the riskiness of
derivatives positions based on the rather crude off-site Call
Report data.
Alternatively, it may be that examiners do fully evaluate,
and take into consideration during detailed on-site examinations,
the risk embedded in derivatives positions. In that case, the
lack of significant effects on CAMEL downgrades emanating from
measures of derivatives activity would be consistent with banks
using derivatives activity to hedge, that is, using derivatives
to reduce overall risk rather than to take speculative positions.
However, the lack of significance for formal regulatory actions
is more difficult to justify, given the role such actions play in
19early intervention intended to prevent troubled banks from taking
second bets that could lead to more serious problems for the
bank. Considering the ease with which derivatives positions can
be altered without detection during nonexam periods, and given
the incentive troubled banks have to take speculative positions
to try to recover from their depleted capital positions, it is
surprising that the derivatives activity measures do not play a
role in the imposition of formal actions.
In contrast to the derivatives variables, a number of the
other possible determinants of CAMEL downgrades and the
imposition of formal actions do have statistically significant
estimated coefficients with the anticipated sign. The risk-based
capital ratio has the predicted negative sign in each case and is
significant at the 1 percent level in the CAMEL 4 and CAMEL 5
downgrade equations, indicating that the lower the capital ratio,
the more likely is a rating downgrade. The lack of a significant
coefficient in the formal actions equations may be related to the
fact that formal actions frequently are imposed on banks when
their capital ratios are still well above minimum requirements
(Peek and Rosengren 1996).
Nonperforming loans have the anticipated positive effect,
are significant at the 1 percent level in the CAMEL 4 equation,
and just miss being significant at the 5 percent level in the
formal actions equation. The OREO variable has the predicted
positive coefficient and is significant in each of the equations.
The three variables measuring portfolio composition have the
20anticipated positive effect in almost every instance (the CAMEL 5
equations are the exceptions) , although the estimated coefficient
is significant only for C&I loans in the CAMEL 4 equation.
The estimated coefficients on the GAP variables are each




5 downgrade equations, indicating that the GAP
may be particularly scrutinized at banks in imminent
being closed. However, the GAP effects are not
significant in the other equations, with
which enters with a significant negative
4 downgrade equations.
the exception of GAP2,
coefficient in the CAMEL
The return on assets has the expected negative sign and is
highly significant in each equation. Liquid assets always has a
positive estimated coefficient, but is significant’ only in the
CAMEL 4 downgrade equations. Finally, bank size always has a
negative effect, but is significant only for the first CAMEL 5
downgrade equation.
Measuring goodness of fit is problematic for logistic
models . A standard but arbitrary measure is the percentage
correctly predicted, based on a 50 percent threshold (predicted=l
if probability>50 percent; predicted=O if probability‹50
percent) . However, if the percentage of observations equal to 1
is substantially less than 50 percent, as is the case here, that
threshold can be particularly inappropriate. An alternative but
still somewhat arbitrary threshold is the actual proportion of
observations equal to 1. Still another measure that provides an
21indication of the ability of the equation to identify the events
(here, a CAMEL downgrade or the imposition of a formal action) is
a comparison of the mean fitted probability of observations equal
to 1 to that for the observations equal to O.
Table 4 (bottom panels) contains such summary information
for each equation. For the CAMEL 4 downgrade equations, the mean
fitted probability for those observations with a value of one is
more than 25 times that for observations with a value of zero.
For the CAMEL 5 downgrade equations, it is more than 100 times
that for observations with a value of zero. Thus , these
equations do a very good job of distinguishing between downgrade
quarters and non-downgrade quarters. While the ratio of the mean
fitted probability for those observations with a value of one to
that for observations with a value of zero is not nearly as high
for the formal action equations, the ratio still has a relatively
impressive value of over eight.
Based on a threshold value equal to the actual proportion of
observations equal to one, the fit of the CAMEL downgrade
equations is quite impressive. Approximately 95 percent of the
observations of a downgrade to a CAMEL 4 rating and 99 percent of
the observations of a downgrade to a CAMEL 5 rating are correctly
predicted. At the same time, only about 7.5 percent and 4
percent of the non-downgrade observations are incorrectly
predicted in the CAMEL 4 and CAMEL 5 equations, respectively.5
For the formal actions equations, 79 percent of the observations
of an imposition of a formal action are correctly predicted, with
22only about 13.5 percent of the non-imposition
incorrectly predicted.
These equations appear to do a very good
observations
job of accounting
for the factors that determine CAMEL rating downgrades to 4 or 5
and a reasonably good job of predicting formal actions, even
without any significant contribution from variables reflecting
the derivatives activity of banks. The evidence indicates that a
simple (0,1) measure of whether a bank is engaged in derivatives
activity and measures of the notional value of derivatives
activity relative to a bank’s assets do not appear to play a role
in determining CAMEL rating downgrades or the imposition of
formal actions. However, our ability to test more interesting
hypotheses, such as whether the contribution of a bank’s
derivatives activity to its overall risk is a factor in
supervisory evaluations, is limited by the currently available




so little left to explain in the CAMEL
unless the risk contribution associated with
activity is highly correlated with other
variables, it is unlikely to have been an
important contributor to supervisory decisions regarding CAMEL




documents that the set of large banks active in
market includes a relatively high percentage of
troubled institutions. Furthermore, a significant fraction of
23banks heavily involved in derivatives activities were subject to
formal regulatory actions during the first half of this decade.
Because problem banks have an incentive to take speculative
positions, the prevalence of problem banks among those actively
engaged in derivatives markets should be of concern to
policymakers.
Given that troubled banks have the motive to place second
bets and that derivatives provide the means, it is important that
such banks not be given the opportunity to do so. However, the
lack of comprehensive information on the derivatives positions of
banks makes it difficult to monitor the riskiness of derivatives
positions, as well as the more important overall risk position of
the bank. With only notional values of positions provided in
call reports, off-site monitoring of risk is limited.
Furthermore,
activity are
on-site targeted examinations of derivatives
relatively infrequent and typically are scheduled
well in advance, providing an opportunity for a bank to “window
dress” its derivatives positions. Since derivatives positions
can be altered quickly to reduce risk exposure in the event of an
exam, only those institutions that take large bets and lose are
likely to face the regulatory consequences of derivatives
speculation. Thus , the opportunity for troubled banks to take
unmonitored second bets is very real.
Given the difficulty in monitoring the riskiness of a bank’s
derivatives activity, one might expect that derivatives activity
would be prominently discussed in the formal actions entered into
24with bank regulators. However, most formal actions do not focus
on off-balance-sheet risk, instead concentrating primarily on
credit risk problems with loan portfolios. In addition, we find
no evidence that derivatives activity is a significant factor in
CAMEL downgrades or in regulatory decisions to impose a formal
action.
While this finding is consistent with banks not using
derivatives to take speculative positions, it could also reflect
that banks with the motive, the means, and the opportunity to
take speculative positions have yet to experience the type of
losses that would attract attention. Given the magnitude of the
losses that banks and savings and loans suffered with on-balance-
sheet items over the past 15 years, the lack of more
comprehensive data reporting requirements and more intensive
regulatory monitoring of derivatives activities at troubled banks
may be setting the stage for our next banking crisis.
Derivatives activity is critical at many banks for the
effective hedging of risks; however, it is important that bank
regulators limit the moral hazard problem that arises from the
incentive for troubled banks to use derivatives for speculation.
Since it is very difficult for regulators to detect the use of
derivatives by banks to take speculative positions until such
second bets are lost, derivatives activity should have a more
prominent role in formal regulatory actions at troubled banks.
Doing so would put management on notice that penalties for taking
second bets would be more severe, with the civil and criminal
25penalties associated with violating formal actions providing an
added incentive for the management and Board of Directors to
refrain from speculative activity.
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28Footnotes
1. Regulators also use informal agreements, such as the
memorandum of understanding (MOU) . MOUs are agreements between
bank supervisors and a bank detailing actions to improve
deficiencies in the bank’s operations. The MOU offers
suggestions likely to be discussed at the end of any full exam,
but serves to emphasize that the findings during the exam were
not satisfactory. The MOU generally is not made public and is
not legally enforceable, so it emphasizes the need for changes by
bank management without the potential penalties and attention
generated by more serious actions. Because MOUs are not publicly
available, we base our analysis of supervisory intervention on
formal regulatory actions.
2. Bank supervisors rate the financial condition of a bank
considering the capital adequacy, asset quality, management
quality, earnings potential, and liquidity of the institution
(CAMEL) . Each component is evaluated on a scale from 1 to 5,
with 1 being the highest rating and 5 the lowest. The composite
CAMEL rating, which also ranges from 1 to 5, provides an
assessment by examiners of the overall strength of a banking
institution. Banks with a composite rating of 1 (sound in every
respect, flawless performance) and 2 (fundamentally sound, only
minor correctable weaknesses in performance) are resistant to
external economic and financial disturbances and are not likely
to be constrained by regulatory oversight. As a bank’s composite
rating falls to 3 (remote probability of failure, flawed
performance) , 4 (potential of failure, performance could impair
viability) , or 5 (high probability of failure, critically
deficient performance), the supervisor’s assessment of the
likelihood of failure increases.
3. The standard practice of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) is to date examinations (which are reported in
the formal  actions) as of the beginning of the exam. The Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) , on the other hand,
typically reports “as of” dates that refer to the date of
financial data used in the report, often the end-of-quarter call
report date immediately preceding the start of the exam.
Consequently, when the OCC exam date is the last day of a
quarter, we denote the subsequent quarter in which the exam began
as the exam quarter.
According to discussions with examiners, banks normally will
know they are likely to receive a formal action at the beginning
of the exam, although the actual formal action is often not
signed for several months or even quarters after the completion
of the exam. Furthermore, many of the provisions of the formal
action that are time dependent are dated as of the commencement
of the exam. Finally, Peek and Rosengren (1995b) have found that
bank behavioral responses, such as declines in lending, occur
29discretely in the quarter in which the exam resulting in the
formal action is initiated, consistent with this dating practice.
4. Therefore, with multiple downgrades we use only the first
observation. For example, if the quarterly CAMEL pattern was 3,
4, 3, 4, the last two observations would be dropped and the
second quarter in the sequence would have a value of 1,
representing the first quarter the bank had been downgraded to a
CAMEL 4 rating. There were only two such instances for CAMEL 4
downgrades and only one bank with a multiple downgrade to a CAMEL
5 rating.
5. One could argue that interpreting all of these observations
as misses is an overstatement. For example, some of the “missed”
predictions occur because the logit identifies a bank as a
problem bank before the bank actually receives a formal action.
If a bank has a high fitted probability in the observation prior
to receiving the formal action, the observation will be
identified as being incorrect. It is possible that at least some
of these “misses” could be related to a delay in imposing a
formal action related to regulatory forbearance.
30Table 1
Top 25 U.S. Banks Based on Notional Value of Exchange Rate Derivatives, 1990:I
1 1 1 I
I
Bank I
Notional Value of Total Assets Exchange Rate
Exchange Rate ($000) Derivatives as a
18 First Union NB North Carolina 5065585 17867156 28Table 2
Top 25 U.S. Banks Based on Notional Value of Interest Rate Derivatives, 1990:I
Bank Notional Value of Total Assets Interest Rate





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Exchange rate dummy 0.543 1.340 0.086
(1.21) (1 .69) (0.23)
Interest rate dummy -0.366 0.531 -0.502
Total derivatives dummy -0.372 0.715 -0.246
(1.08) (1.16) (0.82)
Risk-Based Capital Ratio -0.313** -0.305** -1.128** -1.103** -0.057 -0.054
(4.52) (4.38) (6.42) (6.40) (1.40) (1.33)
0.392** 0.391** 0.064 0.058 0.126 0.125
Assets (3.91) (3.93) (0.58) (0.53) (1.94) (1.93)
0.039* 0.044* -0.005 0.013 0.023 0.021
Assets (2.01) (2.31) (0.14) (0.41) (1.45) (1.40)
0.032 0.028 -0.064 -0.070 0.036
Assets (1.22) (1.08) (1.04) (1.16) (1.44) (1.59)
GAP2 -0.073* -0.077* 0.138** 0.131** 0.009 0.009
(2.44) (2.52) (3.22) (3.10) (0.39) (0.39)
GAP4 -0.051 -0.053 0. 185** 0.182** -0.021 -0.022
(1 .52) (1.57) (3.76) (3.72) (0.85) (0.88)Table 4
-0.004 -0.004 0.071 0.074 0.052 0.046
Assets (0.09) (0.09) (1.22) (1.30) (1.58) (1.41)
Log (Assets) -0.254 -0.085 -0.753* -0.551 -0.100 -0.115
Observations 2691 2691 3091 3091 2831 2831
Proportion of .051282 .051282 .022323 .022323 .037089 .037089
Observations = 1
Mean fitted probability .023 .023 .007 .007 .029 .029
of observations= O
lpredicted =0, actual= 1 5.1 4.3 1.4 1.4 21.0 21.0
2predicted = 1. actual= O 7.4 7.5 3.8 4.1 13.6 13.5
1 Percent refers to the proportion of observations equal to 1 based on a threshold probability equal to the
actual share of observations equal to 1.
2 Percent refers to the proportion of observations equal to O based on a threshold probability equal to the
actual share of observations equal to 1.
Absolute values of t-statistics in parentheses.
* significant at the 5 percent level.
**significant at the 1 percent level.